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This week saw the High Court clash between the swap provider, UBS, and the recently appointed replacement note trustee (Glas Trust Corporation) on the embattled Fairhold Securitisation.  The dispute at hand centres on whether or not the ad hoc noteholders group’s fees and expenses (comprising the fees of its financial adviser and lawyers) can be recovered from the waterfall, effectively subordinating payments to the swap providers and noteholders.  The financial adviser’s fees were reported to be in excess of £3.75m.
Continue Reading Fairhold Securitisation – can noteholders claim advisers’ fees through the trustee?

So Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL plc (Eurosail) is not ‘balance sheet’ insolvent, no event of default has occurred under the RMBS notes it has issued and a post-enforcement call option (PECO) does not make limited recourse any of the notes it relates to.

Those are the conclusions of the Supreme Court (see here) after it substantially re-affirmed the judgments of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal in the case of BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail UK 2007-3BL and others.

Facts

For those unfamiliar with the facts, the case concerned an attempt by certain A3 noteholders to have an event of default under the notes declared on the basis that Eurosail was balance sheet insolvent due to, amongst other things, losses incurred as a result of the lack of currency swaps originally provided by Lehman Brothers.  The key argument being that the audited balance sheet of Eurosail showed an excess of liabilities over assets and that losses from the loss of the currency swaps could not realistically be recovered. 
Continue Reading ‘Point of no return’ is not the point says Supreme Court

As some of you may have seen, Fitch helpfully issued a press release last week clarifying its position on providing rating agency confirmations (RACs) during the replacement of special servicers on EMEA CMBS transactions. Rather unhelpfully, however, the release stated they would not be providing any such RACs in the future. This policy, of course, applies to the very transactions that Fitch rated (in the majority of cases) at inception which contained (presumably, either at Fitch’s request or at the very least with their knowledge) the requirement that such RACs be obtained from the relevant rating agencies before any transfer of the special servicer function could occur.

The right to replace the special servicer of a particular loan in a CMBS transaction typically lies with party that is exposed to the first loss position in relation to that loan i.e. either the B-piece lender or the lowest ranked class of noteholders (usually labelled the ‘controlling party’ or ‘controlling class’). Such controlling party or controlling class therefore has a strong economic incentive to ensure that the maximum recovery from the loan is achieved by the special servicer.
Continue Reading What the Fitch??!

Following the boom years of securitisation origination and the well documented post-Lehman troubles securitisation transactions are now coming to the end of their life cycles as assets default, are re-financed or bought back by originators. However, there are typically numerous legal and accounting costs – and possibly taxes – associated with unwinding a securitisation such as releasing security, terminating the legal agreements and liquidating the issuer (and any related entities such as the SPV holding companies and SPV holders of post-enforcement call options). The fact that, usually, little thought was given at the outset of a transaction as to how such costs should be allocated, begs the question “who pays”?
Continue Reading Winding up securitisation issuers: who pays?