So called ‘sunshine backed bonds’ are one of the newest and most exciting asset classes to enter the asset-backed securities market since the financial crisis. The resurgence of the market has led to a number of esoteric ABS issuances in recent months but it was solar energy that seemed most ripe for applying securitisation techniques (which provide an especially powerful financing tool). Indeed, given how this financing technique revolutionised the mortgage finance market 30 years ago, it now seems poised to play a role in transforming the renewable energy markets across Europe.

The case for securitising solar

In essence, securitisation allows companies to access the capital markets and in so doing to bring down their cost of capital and improve liquidity. Pools of illiquid assets are sold to bankruptcy-remote vehicles which then issue bonds to investors which are backed by the pool of assets. The originator of the assets is able to turn illiquid assets into saleable securities and in so doing shift those assets, and the risk of ownership, off its balance sheet in return for new finance.
Continue Reading Sunshine backed bonds – time to look on the sunny side?

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision announced yesterday that it had finalised the rules for the Liquidity Coverage Ratio or LCR i.e. the main mechanic for regulating liquidity in the Basel III package of reforms.

The LCR requires that a bank hold a sufficient stock of “High Quality Liquid Assets” to meet its net cash outflows in a hypothetical stress scenario. The rules set out the parameters for the stress scenario, the calculation of the net cash outflow and the type of assets which can constitute High Quality Liquid Assets.

Lobbying has achieved a notable success as certain “residential mortgage-backed securities rated AA or higher” can now be included in a bank’s stock of high quality liquid assets (subject to a 25% haircut, which is lower than the haircut applied to some corporate debt securities and to the limitation that this component can form no more than 15% of the buffer as a whole).
Continue Reading RMBS can form part of the Basel III liquidity buffer. Some good news for the structured finance industry.

A new consultation paper  published earlier this week by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision will inevitably cause uncertainty and is likely to affect investment decisions long before the new rules take effect.

The paper sets out the Committee’s proposal to revise the treatment of securitisation exposures and is largely inspired by the belief that highly-rated securitisations currently attract too little regulatory capital and low-rated senior securitisations are subject to regulatory capital charges which are too high. The proposals are relatively high level. The Committee has invited the submission of comments by 15 March  2013. Responses to the public consultation, together with the results of a quantitative impact study, will be considered as the Committee moves forward to suggest detailed amendments to the securitisation framework.
Continue Reading Basel Committee proposes changes to the Basel II securitisation framework – what does this mean for new issuance?

Quite apart from its economic merits, the attractiveness of ABS for investors has become something of a hostage to financial regulation.  On 26 September 2012, Jonathan Faull,  director-general, Internal Market and Services at the European Commission wrote to Gabriel Bernardino of EIOPA (the European insurance regulator) suggesting that capital requirements under Solvency II for “long-term investment”, such as investment in infrastructure projects, could be reduced, including where such investment is made in the form of securitisation.  It has been reported that the ECB is promoting the idea that certain ABS be eligible for inclusion in the liquidity buffer under Basel III. Both of these changes could greatly increase the liquidity and hence the attractiveness of certain types of asset-backed security. 
Continue Reading Are regulators waking up to the need to encourage securitisation?

As was common at the time of the inception of the transaction, Danske Bank A/S (Danske) had provided a liquidity facility (LF) on a commercial mortgage-backed securitisation issued by the issuer, Gemini (Eclipse 2006-3) plc (Gemini).  Due to the subsequent plethora of downgrades that have followed the financial crisis (from which the liquidity facility provider did not escape), a liquidity stand-by drawing of £64,000,000 was made by Gemini. The liquidity facility provider was entitled under the liquidity facility to recover any increased costs as a result of the application of Basel II (as implemented in Denmark) to the LF.  A subsequent withdrawal by Moody’s of the separate rating obtained in relation to the LF caused a rise in the increased costs due to Danske being required to set aside more capital for regulatory purposes.
Continue Reading The Liquidity Eclipse